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The same thing happened in 1956 in our presidential
primary between Kefauver and Stevenson. . .. In politics, you usually beat yourself, you don't get defeated,
. . . especially when you're in office." (The Red River
Scene, Nov. 14, 1966). This statement, in general, expresses my own views of the election of 1966.
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Democracy on Trial in Asia
]OOINN LEE

University of Minnesota, Morris
ABSTRACT - A study of the feasibility of democracy in the developing nations in Asia. The premise of this study is that the Asian concept of democracy is not tantamount to the Anglo-American
counterpart. The vorious types of democracy that exist in the new nations of Asia today are, in
fact, alternative to Western democracy and are hardly democracy at all. Rather, they are authoritarian regimes. The emerging nations of Asia are at the threshold of political modernization,
and such contingency can be met by a particular socio-political system. The authoritarian regimes
of Asia are such systems in point. The requisites of democracy are not yet readily available in the
developing nations of Asia and authoritarianism appears as a symptom of the birth of new nations from old societies. However, the present rejection of democracy in Asia does not necessarily
mean that democracy will not be feasible in Asia in the future.

'Jhe record of nation-building in twentieth-century
Asia seems to commence with a chapter on the establishment of authoritarianism, despite our firm conviction
that democracy is the best form of political system for
all nations and that popular government will ultimately
triumph over dictatorial government. In most Asian
emerging nations, many of the paraphernalia of democracy
ended with forms devoid of substance. Representative
governments have more frequently failed than succeeded
to grow and bear fruits. The political culture of Asia does
not seem to provide the Asians with a fertile ground for
democratic institutions. What makes the lure of authoritarianism so forceful and the appeal of democracy so
powerless in Asia? This question requires us to analyze
the feasibility of democracy in the developing nations of
Asia.
Social Setting of Asian Developing Nations
and the Requisites of Effective Democracy

Asiatic society is basically what Wittfogel (1963: 8
and passim) referred to as "hydraulic society" and "agromanagerial or agrobureaucratic society." These societies are featured by social conservatism, extreme localism, and fairly rigid local structures. Traditionally
Oriental societies were accustomed to the despotic
strength of political authority. In such rigidly stratified
agrarian societies, the strength of a nation was often
The author received the B. A., summa cum /aude, from Chosun Christian University, 1957; M. A., University of North
Dakota, 1958; and Ph.D., University of Illinois, 1962, in political science. Since 1961, he has been associated with the
University of Minnesota, Morris, where he is currently Associate professor in the Department of Political Science.
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based on patriotic feeling of the people and on the stability founded upon ancient traditions. Social structure
mainly consisted of a handful of aristocrats, who were
land owners, artisans, bureaucrats, and the rest of the
population, the majority of whom were the peasantry.
The first was in a predominant position to exert influence whereas the last was not represented. Unlike a
property-bound, individualistic Western society, therefore, the tradition-bound, family-based Oriental society
has experienced for the past centuries autocratic political
heritages in which the real political power is oriented by
politicians rather than by the grass roots. As Kautsky
( 1962: 19) pointed out, politics in such a society is "the
only road to prestige and high social position, apart from
the limited opportunities sometimes provided by the religious hierarchy."
In such traditional Asiatic nations, democratic aspirations do not seem to have materialized. Democracy can
be instituted and maintained when there are both accessible elites and available population, and when diverse
interests of society can be sufficiently ba'lanced and represented through the political process. Modern democracy
requires a social system that Kornhauser (1959: 39) defined as a mass society "in which elites are readily accessible to influence by non-elites and non-elites are
readily available for mobilization by elites." Such a mass
society, in turn, must be composed of an educated and
fairly prosperous electorate without concentration of
wealth; social classes without bitter, religious, and sectional antagonisms; and a pluralistic society in which
many private loyalties and associations can prosper; with
all tending to buttress the principles and goals of democracy.
The Minnesota Academy of Science

The traditional Asiatic society, however, does not provide such a syndrome of conditions for effective democracy. What if the Asian states of today were modernized?
Could they then meet the requisites of democracy? History has witnessed in the mid-twentieth century, that
most Asian states are still reluctant to accept democracy
in practice. Why does democracy fail in Asia today?
Above all, it has failed in the "rice eating" quarters of
the world because it does not produce satisfactory results. Within the Asiatic institutional framework, democracy has been unable to supply effective political institutions for the peoples.
In most Asian states, modern society is not yet characterized by the Western standards of modernity, such as,
the comparatively high degree of urbanization, relatively
high per capita income, extensive geographical and social mobility, penetrative networks of mass communication media, widespread literacy, and widespread participation and involvement by members of the society in
modern social and economic processes. 1 Although the
nations are striving for modernization, the vast majority
of their populations still live in villages in a state of extreme poverty, and follow a primitive agriculture. A few
cities of the Orient are as modern as any modern cities
can be, but the rural poverty and backwardness a few
miles away are without equal.
Furthermore, the Asians face the problems of adjustment to the nuclear age with medieval confusions and
contradictions. They are anxious to bridge the gap of
centuries in a few decades. It is a painful and hazardous
transition period - they must, at the same time, try to
solve the age-old problems of expanding population,
shortage of food resources, overflowing social maladies
stemming from the rapidly changing society, and evergrowing problems of unemployment. In addition, Asian
states must overcome the frustrations inherent in the
vacuum that develops when ancient regimes collapse
without being replaced by a new order (Dean, 1957).
The new states in Asia have to face the problems of the
new era into which they were thrust without an adequate
political and administrative organization, without essential skills and technical equipment, and also without a
social preparation that could release the energies of the
community to dea} with the problems of transformation.
Since the traditional society has been battered, public
morality destroyed, and religious belief shaken, what
the people have been left with is poverty, corruption, and
the days of sweat and tears in the midst of confusion
and distress. A wide gap appears between the traditional
mass and the Westernized elite. Stability is hard to maintain in such a transition period, and it is much more difficult to build the delicate mechanisms of the democratic
process.
Can democracy rush in to rescue the Asians from this
catastrophe? Of course, it can, but it is very unlikely that
democracy will flourish or endure in the immediate future in Asian nations because democracy requires a proc1 For
further details, see various measuring yardsticks of
modernity discussed in Almond and Coleman ( 1960) , Geertz
(1963), and Panikkar (1959) .
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ess of maturation that is perhaps too slow to satisfy the
hasty expectations of the Asians. To most of the Asians,
the immediate problem is not industrialization, urbanization, increase of national wealth , or reform of educational systems, but searches for stability and leadership.
Asian politics deals with personalities rather than programs. Like Nietzsche's last men, the Asians are seeking a charismatic leader whose personality, in the eyes
of his people, will have a more than human endowment,
a touch of divine grace and special wisdom ( e.g. Nehru,
Ayub Khan, Sukarno, Mao Tse-tung, Syngman Rhee,
etc.). In most Asian states, therefore, the choice of political systems hinges upon the stability a government
promises its people. In extreme cases of national underdevelopment, people do not really care whether they
have a democracy or a totalitarian government as long as
it provides them with security. To these people, democracy is even regarded as a luxury. They cannot afford to
tolerate the possible defects of democracy, such as deadlock in the legislature because of the obstructionism of a
political party, and the existence of an unorganized electorate controlled by well-organized political agitators. In
fact, political parties themselves often become sources of
schisms. The multi-party system exists in name only and
the one-party system prevails in reality. Neither parliaments nor cabinets seem to represent the people's interests; they are controlled by the party in power - more
precisely by its leader. The new class of political elite
operates without guidance from and a responsibility to
constituencies. Thus, openly aired conflict is the accepted
price of democracy. Insofar as there exist poverty-stricken masses living on a margin of existence, low level of
national income and education, and an elongated pyramid class structure, the prognosis for the perpetuation of
political democracy in Asia is bleak and dismal.
Democracy cannot prosper in a society that is based
on outmoded science and obsolete technology. On the
other hand, scientific work cannot progress in a vacuum.
Without the increase of wealth from the creation of industries, all ideas of democracy are nothing but vain
dreams. In eagerness for modernization, however, many
states in Asia hastily undermine the process of industrialization that is so invaluable to democratization of society. They try to choose a short cut to modernization by
securing effective political leadership. In doing so, they
frequently mistake their dreams and aspirations for their
national ideologies, and, in the long run , they expect democracy to achieve the unachievable. Democracy is not
achieved by acts of will alone. Perhaps, democracy may
be the effective and proper form of political system for
Asian states in the future, but not presently. Thus, the
effectiveness and legitimacy of democracy have been
challenged and democracy per se has become a catch
word for an impractical form of political system.
Authoritarianism Alternative of Democracy
Based on Nationalist and Socialist Symbiosis
In the Asian political scene, therefore, the so-called
"revolution of rising expectations" of Asian nations does
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not tolerate a political system that cannot cope with their
hopes that "someone will usher in a kingdom of God
which will immediately end their suffering" (McCord,
1965 :41). To most Asian nations, time is short and the
desire for modernization is strong. Unless emergency
measures are taken, the gap between desire and reality
will widen further with the passage of time. The problem
of political progress does not lie in realizing replicas of
Western institutions but in discovering political forces
that expedite the process of modernization. In such a
case, there exists "a dilemma of choice between the extent of pluralistic freedom they can afford and the pace
of development they can achieve" (Lowenthal, 1964:
203ff.).
If we follow Organski's ( 1965) classification of the
stages of political development,2 the majority of Asian
nations are still in the stage of the politics of primitive
unification or at the threshold of the politics of industrialization. They are still far from the stages of the politics
of national welfare and the politics of abundance. Many
of the twentieth-century Asian nations are featured by
the characteristics of the nations in their era of nationbuilding, that is, by the search for national identity and
unity. Some that have passed this stage of development
are now striving for the era of industrial modernization
that is markedly characterized by their eagerness to accumulate capital. Yet, seldom have the Asian nations
reached the maturity of growth necessary for the welfare
state, which is concerned with the protection of the citizens rather than with capital, let alone for the age of
automation, in which increased productivity of the automated system promises economic abundance.
For their political stages, a particular socio-political
system is useful for the Asian nations. A fairly decentralized, pluralistic, reconciliation system may not be suitable as a conversion system, whereas a centralized, coercive, mobilization system is more practical and profitable.
Apter (1965: 379) aptly described the mobilization
system.
Mobilization systems utilize hierarchical structures of authority, . . . Authority derives from the
mobilized public, as embodied in some particular instrumentality of the state, such as the single
party or the army, within which the functions of
government center on a single political 'leader. H a
mobilization system has hierarchical authority and
a high degree of consummatory values, each act acquires a sacred significance. More important , the
goals of the leaders come to be endowed with these
consummatory values. The effects are the stimulation
of the population to great efforts, the development of
their creativity and sense of excitement, and the liberation and ennoblement of individuals.
Omnivorously, such a system lays the foundation
of autocratic regimes as the sine qua non of political
modernization.
For the study of political development, Organski's book and
von der Mehden's book ( 1964) are extremely useful. The
former analyzes the stages of a nation's development vertically
from historical perspective and the latter examines horizontally
the developmental patterns of the 84 emerging nations.
2
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Thus, authoritarian regimes emerge as unique types of
new institutions to modify Western liberal democracy. In
the transitional period of nation building, political oscillation is at its peak. The transition from the traditional
Asiatic society to the modern libertarian society cannot
be made at once. To the new nations of Asia, the choice
is not between traditional and modern society but entails
what Millikan and Blackmer (1961: 98) have called " a
third choice":
the gradual modification of the institutions, practices, and structure of the traditional society in the
direction of modernization while retaining some of
its traditional cohesive features.
For this middle path, the modernizing autocracy has
an ideological appeal. It lies at various points between
democracy and totalitarianism. Certainly, it has not
drifted toward the abyss of the sacred-collectivity part
nor has it attempted to cling to the secular-libertarian
part of the continuum. The new nations of Asia rejected
these two extremes of the continuum by choosing the
half-way point, that is , authoritarianism that, according
to Ebenstein (1962: 14) "denies its subjects the freedom
and responsibility of political choice and action, while
still leaving them some degree of freedom and self-expression in non-political matters."
For the prime urgency of nation-building, what these
pattern of authority that is characterized by the use of tradition to validate current practice. Perhaps, a well planned
change of tradition may be made, but neither a wholesale
change nor a complete destruction of tradition is attempted, that is, the solidarity of plural subgroups rather
than the totalitarianization of a regime is the goal. An
authoritarian state does not attempt the atomization and
isolation of the individual, and it seldom brings forth the
total synchronization of all social organizations to make
them serviceable to the state. ~ On the other hand, an authoritatarian state does not follow the typical pattern of
stable Western democracies either. As Lipset ( I 959 :
101) precisely pointed out, the political setting of Asia
is diametrically different from that of Europe:
In Europe at the beginning of modern politics, the
workers were faced with the problem of winning citizenship, the right to take part in the political game,
from the dominant aristocratic and business strata
who controlled politics. In Asia the long-term presence of colonial rulers has identified conservatism as
an ideology and the more well-to-do classes with subservience to colonialism; while, leftist ideologies,
usually of a Marxist variety, have been dominant, being identified with nationalism , .. The left in the
European stable democracies grew gradually in a fight
for more democracy, and gave expression to the discontents involved in early industrialization, while the
right retained the support of traditionalist elements in
the society, until eventually the system came into an
easy balance between a modified left and right. In
Asia, the left is in power during the period of popula3 For the characteristics of totalitarian dictatorship, see Friedrich and Bryzinski ( 1961 :9ff. ) and Neumann ( 1964 :243-247).
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lion explosion and early industrialization, and must
accept responsibility for all the consequent miseries.

In mid-twentieth century Western politics, the traditional demarcation line between the left and right has
become more subtle and separation per se is no longer
vitally important; most of the Western democracies have
reached the maturity-stage of their political developments, thus finding themselves "in a 'post-politics' phase
- that is, there is relatively little difference between the
democratic left and right, the socialists are moderates,
and the conservatives accept the welfare state" (Lipset,
1963:82). The newly developing nations of Asia, however, are still in the infancy of political development, and
this situation requires intense political controversy and
ideology.
Political ideology has been particularly useful for
Asian states, especially in consensus building and in the
creation of political fantasy. In the period of the search
f?~ national identity, when all the political, social, re!1g1ous, and economical problems are unsettled, political
ideology can provide a reservoir of political forces for
them. During this period, these societies have to undertake the acculturation process and it will likely plunge
the people ~nto confusion; in such a transitional society,
"the scene 1s set for the prophet, for the ideological reformer" (Pye, 1962:288). Among the various shades of
poJitical convictions and ideologies in these societies
nationalism and socialism stand out. Both of these ideol~
ogies have been used as both political beliefs and political tools.
Nationalism in these newly born nations usually conveys connotations of a striving for national independence
by forming a national unity centered around national
consciousness. To those nations that were under colonialism, the desire of people to get rid of alien rulers incorporates primordial loyalties and sentiment based on race
language, tribe, etc. In Asian societies where popula;
consensus is generally low, nationalism served as a medium to maintain unity and solidarity among people. In
the meantime, the leadership roles of national movements were taken by the intellectuals who, in turn, were
responsible for modernization, industrialization, and the
grand task of nation building. To these intellectuals,
some of the most urgent problems were elimination of
poverty, aristocratic rule, and foreign rule. Naturally, the
ideological-organizational structure of socialism and
communism provides potential means of modernization.
Furthermore, such ideologies fit comfortably into the
Asian tradition of the tutelage of the elite and the educative state. Frustration and resentment over the status quo
and desire for rapid change made the Asian intellectuals
believe in the scientific truth of Marxism as a philosophy
of hope. Such intellectuals are often "deeply sincere,
deadly serious men in whom burns an inner fire. They
have, generally, a high level of integrity, dedication, and
purpose" (Scalapino, 1965:7). In most of the Asian
states, therefore, socialism has been another name for
nationalism. In such nations, the political development
has been driven by a "dialectic" of political process beJournal of, Volume Thirty-four, No. 2, 1967

tween nationalism and socialism (Apter, 1964:26-28).
Usually, in the pre-independence period, socialism is a
force behind the independence movement and backs it
up by means of furnishing an ideology with a revolutionary theme to a new group of political entrepreneurs. In
the independence period, socialism is in the fore of popular movements and nationalism is rather a latent supporting force; in the post-independence period, however,
socialism often loses its leading role with the appearance
of ruling groups and nationalism. Thus, an authoritarian
regime eventually appears on the basis of a nationalism
and socialism symbiosis - nationalist socialism in which
class struggle is not significant:1
This ruling person or ruling group of persons enact
what Apter (1965: 324ff.) called "The Robin Hood
Role," which "arises during the period of political fantasy, which is also a period of rule confusion. It is filled
by role-testers - individuals who, by defining their roles
a bit larger than life, encourage others to follow suit."
The leaders of these countries, although they may differ
in adopting the appropriate methods of reaching their
goals, are the same in that they employ ideologies that
give expression to common feelings of their people in the
past, present, and future. It is because of this reason that
many of the Asian leaders' intentions are expressed in
humanistic tones. As Sigmund, Jr. (1963 :41) put it,
"Asian philosophy and political practice emphasize conciliation in the resolution of conflict by the attempt to
stress common elements in conflicting views and to
achieve a consensus as a basis for policy." In other
words, political ideologies in emerging nations begin as
the force behind popular movements and frequently end
as serviceable tools for political leaders.
A cursory examination of ideologies in the new nations in the Orient presents the interesting finding that
various types of democracy exist there: the "guided democracy" of Sukarno and King Mahendra," the "basic
democracy" of Ayub Khan, 6 the "true democracy" of U
Nu, the "new democracy" of Mao Tse-tung, the "controlled democracy" of Nehru, the "partyless democracy"
of Narayan, and Badarnaike's "substance of democracy"
and "modified democracy for emergency" in South Korea
and South Viet Nam. By and large, all these versions of
democracy are Asian alternatives to Anglo-American
democracy. Stated in different terms, such democracy is
hardly democracy at all to the Western eyes.
In essence, Sukarno's guided democracy is an ideology
that is broad enough to accommodate nationalism, internationalism, democracy, social justice, and religious elements. It calls for "guidance from above and a consensus
'This type of ideology is the predominant pattern of Asia.
It is certainly influenced by the Marxist interpretation of capitalism and the Leninist views on imperialism, but it does not
accept the entire Marxist-Leninist theory as the goals of action.
Neo-Maoism , for instance, is more interested in industrialization
under the authoritarian and / or totalitarian leaders than in the
championship of the lower class as the victor of class struggle.
' ·Tutelage democracy" in accordance with Shits' typology
(Shi ls, 1962 : 60-66) .
• '' Modernizing oligarchy" according to James Coleman
(Almond and Coleman)) (1960:562-565).
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achieved through discussion" ( von der Mehden, I 964:
129) . In his lecture to the students of Hasanuddin University, Sukarno explained the system of musjawarah
and mufakat ( discussion and agreement).
Regarding our own democracy, I initiated the idea,
calling on the people to join to fight the diseases
that were the results of free-mght liberalism . . . . I
want this guided democracy to become the property of the Indonesian people again .... Think, carry
it out so that as a joint result we can achieve a new
democratic system which I call democracy with
leadership, or guided democracy, which is suitable
for conditions in Indonesia . . . . ( Sigmund, 1963:
62)
Ayub Khan's basic democracy also is a system of local government with a mixture of elected and appointed
representatives. It is an outright challenge to the AngloSaxon political system.
The concept of Basic Democracy intends to resolve
all the conflicts which had been introduced in the
body-politic by the British during their sojourn in
India through the various institutions implanted by
them such as parliamentary democracy, the pyramidal bureaucracy, the ineffective judiciary and the
Anglo-Saxon legal system, the functional educational
system and the class conflicts of the bourgoisie, the
proletariat and that perpetual orphan, the peasantry
(Khan, 1960:49).
Ayub Khan (Sigmund, 1963: 114) himself delineated the nature of basic democracy:
To my mind, there are four prerequisites for the
success of any democratic system in a country like
Pakistan:
1. It should be simple to understand, easy to work,
and cheap to sustain.
2. It should put to the voter only such questions as
he can answer in the light of his own personal
knowledge and understanding without external
prompting.
3. It should ensure the effective participation of all
citizens in the affairs of the country up to the
level of their mental horizon and intellectual caliber.
4. It should be able to produce reasonably strong
and stable governments.
Nehru's Controlled democracy was based on parliamentary government and universal adult franchise . It
was supposedly accountable to the people and to their
representatives. Nonetheless, India's democracy hardly
provides the democratic principles of rotation in office
in India. The most fundamental problem of Indian democracy is well expressed in Ray's apprehension on its
future when he stated, "Centrifugal forces always seem
to prevail in India. If people cannot observe discipline
and maintain the unity of the country, the enforced discipline may come from military dictatorship or even from
external authorities" ( Ray, 1960: 136) .
The new democracy of Mao Tse-tung has not identified
itself with the so-called formula-Marxism and it contends
150

that the "socialistic revolution " - construction of new democracy - should be preceded by the "democratic revolution" - destruction of imperialism and feudalism . By espousing Chinese nationalism to an Asiatic form of Marxism, Mao's Chinese policies reflect the common aspirations of the developing nations. Nevertheless, Mao's "new
democracy " as an antithesis of " old democracy" is totalitarian dictatorship and it necessarily retreats from democracy in the Western sense. Mao's attempt to Sinify Marxism appeared in his report to the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, in 1938.
Today's China is an outgrowth of historic China.
We are Marxist historicists; we must not mutilate
history. From Confucius to Sun Yat-sen we must
sum it up critically, and we must constitute ourselves
the heirs of all that is precious in this past . . . A
Communist is a Marxist internationalist, but Marxism must take on a national form before it can be
applied (Schram, 1963 :57).
To sum up, all the various types of democracy claimed by
the new nations of Asia promise in fact a political system
of authoritarianism. In Gibson's words, " Most of the leaders of the new states feel that they are not yet ready for
Western-style democracy. Most of them also reject totalitarianism" ( Gibson, 1964: 262).
The birth of authoritarianism in Asia also reflects the
backwardness of economic development in that region.
These modernizing autocracies are natural solutions to the
dilemmas of economic development, such as problems of
capital accumulation, agricultural reforms, and industrialization. Most of the countries have not yet reached what
Rostow termed the "take-off" stage of economic development. 7 Yet they always aspire after the affluent society.
Such aspirations for new patterns of economic life cannot
be satisfied for the people unless a drastic change occurs
on the level and in the modes of organization of economic
systems. The transformation from traditional status to selfsufficiency of an agrarian environment that lacks many
special technologies available in a modern industrial society requires considerable organization adaptation and
mobilization of human resources. For such economic enterprise, democracy seems to be unfit and, in effect, seems
to undermine speedy industrialization by retarding the
momentum of economic development. Consequently, new
nations of Asia turn to authoritarianism for this reason
also.
• As to the "take-off" concept, there are conflicting opinions
among scholars. Some doubt the guarantee of self-sustained
stage of economic development , and others are suspicious
predictions of the circumstances under which this stage of
growth occurs. I use this concept , following Rostow's definition:
"(a) a rise in the rate of productive investment from (say)
5 per cent or less to over IO per cent of national income ( or
net national product); ( b) the development of one or more
substantial manufacturing sectors, with a high rate of growth;
(c) the existence or quick emergence of a political, social and
institutional frame work which exploits the impulses to expansion in the modern sector and the potential external economy
effects of the take-off and gives to growth an on-going character." (Rostow, 1962:284)
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The Make-up of Authoritarianism: It's raison d'etre

Once democracy is identified with an unworkable political system in Asia, a tight authoritarian direction is believed more likely to make present-day poor societies
richer than an open, competitive, liberal democracy. Society is overburdened by poverty, and dictatorship looms
on the horizon as a symptom of the birth of new nations
from old societies. The general trend of Asian society is
directed toward centralism. That means, as we have seen,
that Asian social characteristics favor either authoritarian
rule of the small elite class or one-man dictatorship backed
by popular support, because an Oriental society is, in general, divided between a large impoverished mass and a
small favored elite. More often than not, democracy is
identified with corruption - " bribery," "election-rigging,"
"vote buying," "favoritism," "factions," and "rotation of
political power among elite members," and so on.
National politics in these nations frequently operates in
the name of democracy to seize some profit from a momentary combination of favorable circumstances. Political
parties degenerate into factional strife and corruption, and
rational policy-making is also impeded, for decisions tend
to be compromises based on the relative strength of the
factions rather than on objective factors. Politicians switch
loyalties frequently. In most Asian countries, a corrupt
government can remain in power if it has strong points to
offset the corruption, but the mass of people are still the
victims of such a society. In fact, such a government loses
touch with the masses and regards all opposition as treason
and all criticism against the government as sedition . When
the oppression and corruption of a government reach a
breaking point, and when the deterioration of society and
the sterility of the government reveal their ugly realities,
then the masses, facing death from either poverty or oppression, revolt against the government.
First of all, religion comes in to protect the masses from
their powerlessness and insecurity. People rely on suprapersonal power to escape their distress. Thus, the political
implications of the religions are enormous in Asia. Some
"moral issues" in politics, such as prohibition, vice control, and " political issues" - civilian rule against military
rule , and peace against war - are rel ated to the ethics and
faiths of religions. Thus, efforts to relate religions to politics appear in the Asian political scene. Through religions,
many Asians find new warmth and the meaning of community at a deeper level. The authority of religion is a subject of great importance in its relation to tradition. When
religious faith is equated with what we may call "political
morality" and when it becomes so preoccupied with means
that loses sight of ends, church religion turns into political
religion. Political messianism of religions, in turn, produces militant mass organizations with a moral purpose.
It is why religion and politics become two separate ideologies that are in competition but continue to co-exist, each
representing powerful institutional forces. In nations
where social institutions, especially law and custom, have
the sanction of religion and are considered a part of religious life, there is an inevitable conflict between religions
and the changing nature of the society ( e.g., Hinduism,
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Islam, etc.). Religion as an asset in cementing the struggle
of nationalism against foreign rule can easily become the
sentinel of the civil coup with l' esprit d' armee against the
corrupted government. Especially Buddhism in Asia is
making its most vigorous, most open attempt to seize temporal power ( see Soka Gakkai in Japan and Buddhism in
Southeast Asia).
Secondly, the intelligentsia with high education and
mastery of technical skills may lead the masses against the
corrupted political power. In the politics of the new states
of Asia, intellectuals occupy a prominent position - virtually, they are in a position to create the political life of
their countries. Being exposed to the set course of modern
culture and education, they bear responsibilities for setting
their countries on their feet. This, in turn, means the high
degree of political involvement of the intellectual. Generally, intellectuals are men of ideas rather than men of action
and often lack the organization and power necessary to
seize control and reshape the society. They are vulnerable
to popular sentiments and are more reformers than revolutionaries. '
Students emerge from the political and economic Dark
Age that lies over the Asian continent as modernizing
youth. They are becoming qualified to act as the moving
force of the center of society and they are identified as a
group that upholds civic virtue. Today, however, the Asian
youth confronts all the frustrating situations - the burning
desires of the youth are quenched by harsh treatment of
the society. Their spirit and ideals are far ahead of the society. Those who do succeed in getting higher educations
are graduated into an environment where there are insufficient opportunities for realizing their knowledge and expectations. The result is bitter resentment against the establishments surrounding them. The government, the
young believe, has failed them. So they demand reforms,
or they try to turn the villains out. The revolt of the students against th e government is not, therefore, a class revolution. It is a sheer outburst of frustration and a manifestation of the fury of the frustrated youth.
Thirdly, the military seems to have the best opportunity
to be drawn into domestic politics to correct the wrongs of
civilian institutions. The political role of the military is enhanced by the fact that it has efficient organization, mobility, professional experience of leadership, Westernization,
mastery of modern technology, the monopoly and control
of armed violence, etc. Hence, the army comes closest
to the ideal of a modernized, elite organization in Asia.
The military of Asian states are, therefore, more politicized than their Western counterparts, and they may even
produce a cadre of political activities. The garrison-state
model as offered by J anowitz ( 1964) seems to be the best
suitable model for describing the political role of the military in Asia. In any case, the domination of politics by the
military seems to be the end result of the ascent to power
of the military elite under the conditions of prolonged cor• Cf .. Edward Shils, "The Intellectuals in the Political Development of the New States." World Politics, XII, No. 3 (April,
I 960) , 329- 368; and Harry J. Benda , "Non-Western Intelligentsias as Political Elites," The A.11stralian Journal of Politics- and
History, YI, No. 2 (November, 1960) , 205-218 .
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ruption of a society. As Brecher (1963: 68) succinctly
stated,
the military rose to power on the crest of a wave of
despair - despair with civili an government in general
and democracy in particular. Much had been promised by the nationalist politicians and relatively little
had been achieved. The spectacle of corruption am!
inefficiency did not endear democracy to those who
pondered the future, either the middle class or the
army. But the latter had distinct assets.
Asian circumstances encourage an extension of the
tasks and power of military leaderships and actually force
such trends.
Finally, it is American foreign policy toward Asia that
set the stage for military ascendancy in Asia . In many
states in Asia, the provision of American arms did little to
give the populace confidence in the recognized government; the military build-up was sometimes conducive to
the growth of the internal disruptions of a nation; and the
resultant imbalance between the armament and the virtue
of the ruling regimes put the enemy at vantage . If U . S.
foreign policy toward the new states in Asia is centered
~1erely on the military build-up as a means of bringing
forth fresh political approaches in Asia , such foreign policy
is militarily foolish , politically unsound, economically disastrous, and morally questionable. For the main problems
that U.S. policy confronts in Asia are not military but political, economic, and perhaps most important of all, psychological.
Democracy cannot be imposed upon the people in
Asia at gun point. The United States should inspire the
confidence of these people in American motives, goals,
and her posture toward Asian affairs . To the people who
have revolutionary potential and international aspirations, it is very likely that U. S. feeling of pride in h er
own achievement in these areas looks and sounds like
arrogance, and that U. S. tactics of military pressure or
financial hand-outs as the means of coercing Asians into
our political influence invites their hostility toward and
suspicion of this country. Therefore, the United States
should win her victory in A sia through proving the advantages of democracy to the people. Of course, it is a
tremendous and pain staking task. Yet, it is what our
country should face if we want to have the edge over a
totalitarian enemy capable of wielding its enormous human and national resources as a unified force. Also the
United States should be able to convince the people of
Asia that we are genuinely interested in them . The worst
possible blunder this country may commit in her foreign
policy in these new nations of Asia is to give them an
impression that they are looked down upon as beggars,
rather than as friends, by the United States. "We (Americans) must learn to identify and deal with Asian problems in Asian terms, not solely in terms of our own experiences" (U.S. Congress, Senate, 1959, Study No. 5:
27).
It is therefore necessary that a reassessment of U. S.
policy in Asia be made. The adaptation of American
policy toward Asian states must be based on a thorough
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understanding of the attitudes of " Nefos" toward "O]dfos." In the absence of native skills, the result of the
transplantation of technology alone will not bring advancement to the country; it will bri ng the effective loss
of its political power. Although it has been improved
recently, the traditional U. S. policy in Asia has been
based to a considerable degree on improvisation, and no
adequate capacities both for limited conventional war
and for local guerrilla wa r has been fully developed. As
a resul't, this country has confronted difficulties both in
~djustin¥ _her policy to Asian revolutionary process and
in exe rcising her leadership.
Perhaps the policy of the United States in Asia should
be directed to finding means to contribute to the political
education of these countries rather than to the condemnation of their present situations. U. S. diplomacy must
be capable of dealing more effectively with neutral and
authoritarian governments. It is very important for the
United States to get in touch with every element of real
power, especially potential political comers for the
"next" governments in Asian countries, because the span
of life of the incumbent political executives is frequently
shortened by the instability of the new states. In fact
political upheaval of politicians fluctuates like a yo-yo'.
In many cases the "ins" are already halfway on their way
out. It is also vital to the interest of this country that the
United States support programs rather than regimes . The
major difficulty of U. S. policy comes quite often from
supporting "shadow projects" that are designed primarily
to benefit groups in power. An emphasis on a few longterm programs of major significance, rather than a host
of miscellaneous small projects, and an avoidance of
touchy issues (e.g., national sovereignty, domestic decisions, etc.) are highly desirable . It is also wise for this
country to work through multilateral organizations and
nonpolitical organizations, such as private or international agencies, in the developing nations in Asia (see
U.S. Congress, Senate 1959, Study No . 6).
Since no nation in the Orient has escaped nationalist
ferment , nationalism may still prove what Rcischauer
( i 9 5 5: 269) referred to as " the nuclear weapon of the
situation in Asia." Asian nationalism has challenoed
J
.""
\ \ estern democracy and been wooed by communism,
and it has been attracted by neutralism. In A sia, the
long-term presence of Colonial rulers makes it possible
that leftist ideologies are identified with nationalism. In
reaiity, nationalism in Asia is more the reflection of antiforeign and antiminority sentiments than of a widespread
sense of national unity. Nationalism is often a reaction
against a status of inferiority and an urge toward self
respect, power, and control of one's own destiny. By
espousing the cau se of nationalism, communism has won
a great asset. The search for national identity and personality frequently favors the fortunes of communism.
Communism will appeal to Asian people so long as they
face population explosions, primitive industrialization,
and all their consequent miseries. Nationalism in Asia is
also closely related to neutralism. The political nonalignment policy of Asian states is the crystallization of the
consideration of such factors as domestic pressures, geo-
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graphic locations, and the tradition of nationalistic movements in the individual nations. To find a modus vivandi
with both the United States and the Soviet Union without
antagonizing either seems to be advantageous for the
emerging nations in Asia. Generally, nationalism, as a
vital force in striving to build nation-state, is constructive
when it contributes to the development of a single system
of central authority and the institutionalization of rationalistic values. As a political force, nationalism may drive
Asian nations to achieve the double end of becoming
modernized and at the same time retaining their own cultural heritages. However, nationalism is certainly destructive and dangerous if it is controlled by narrow
racism, bigotry, and disapproval of all foreign political
systems, including democracy.
Conclusion

The problem Asia confronts today is therefore not the
problem of the desirability of democracy but of its feasibility. Democracy is desirable but it is not workable or
sometimes unattainable, whereas authoritarianism is
workable even if it may not be desirable. In a society in
which the family rather than the individual has been a
basic social unit, and the middle class cannot exert a
stabilizing influence, democracy as a political system
often results in social instability. With a paucity of personnel and technical equipment, democracy remains a
borrowed ideology, whose implications are little understood and whose institutions have no special significance.
For instance, the loan of foreign experts or imports of
technical assistance alone cannot solve the problems of
the shortage of administrative organizations in the developing nations of Asia. To get out of their economic backwardness, the new nations of Asia lean more toward
comprehensive state planning systems, and this planned
economic development is very much sympathetic to
either a totalitarian or an authoritarian government,
which can enforce its policy by mobilizing the masses
without open protests.
By the same token, however, there are several dangers
of authoritarianism in Asia. While authoritarian coercion
may lead the society to a rapid modernization, the very
reverse of this wishful effect may also arise. Since government controls all capital, all natural resources, and all
labor, if it makes a mistake in the process of economic
modernization, such a mistake cannot be checked in
time and will result in a calamity, as was seen in the
fate of the Chinese Great-Leap-Forward plan, and in the
communal system in the Indonesian economic plan for
heavy industry in lieu of light industry, although emphasis on the latter has the better chance of conserving capital and using the reservoir of idle man power. A sheer
increase of pressure by a government cannot expedite
modernization; rather, it will deprive the people of initiative and willingness. Political control is one thing and
economic development is a completely different thing.
Consequently, authoritarianism is not the permanent
solution to the developmental problems of the Asians.
Under the present circumstances, democracy seems to
be losing its grip on Asian states and the vacuum thus
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created invites dictatorial regimes in to defend the poor
and the oppressed. At present, the Asian choice of political system ranges from democracy, to noncommunist
authoritarianism, to communist dictatorship. Yet, it is
interesting to note that all, despite the fact that democracy looks like an illusion to them, have committed
themselves to the principles of democracy, at least in
their intentions. Most of them turned away from democracy to embrace authoritarianism based on the practice
of a party-state, or coerced election; of hand-picked legislatures; of one-man rule, or judiciary under procurators'
supervision; and of severe limitation of individual rights.
Nontheless, their goal is to achieve the principle of representative legislation, periodic secret, free elections; the
rule of law, guarded by an independent judiciary; and
individual rights well guaranteed.
Democracy exists and has existed in a variety of circumstances, even if it is most commonly sustained by a
limited cluster of conditions. It is not democracy that
betrays Asian expectations but the Asian expectations
that are too gigantic to be swallowed at one gulp by
democracy. Under the present circumstances, the success of democracy rather than its failure in Asia would
be surprising. Nevertheless, we should not regard the
frequent disparagement of democracy in Asia as a defeat. Present rejection of democracy in Asia does not
necessarily mean that democracy will not be realized in
the future.
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Learned Societies Around the World
Spain

Royal Spanish Arndemy of Language (Real Academia Espanola do la Lengua).
Founded 1713. Devoted to cultivation of Spanish language and literature. Oldest
and most important of the Spanish Academies. Organizes literary competitions.
Publications : Dictionary of the Spanish language; Spanish grammar; editions of
classical writers (Cervantes).
Royal Academy of Fine Arts of San Fernando (Real Academia de Bellas Artes
de San Fernando). Founded 1744.
Royal Academy of Medicine (Real Academia de Medicina). Founded 1773 .
Royal Academy of Legislation and Jurisprudence (Real Academia de Legislacion y Jurisprudencia). Founded 1826.
Royal A cademy of Natural, Physical and Exact Sciences (Real Academia de
Ciencias Exactas, Fisicas y N aturales). Founded 184 7.
Royal Academy of Moral and Political Sciences (Real Academia de Ciencias
Morales y Politicas). Founded 1857.
Royal Academy of Pharmacy (Re al Academia da Farmacia). Founded 1932.
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